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This paper examines possible differences in auditors’ performance when they make belief-
based versus probability-based risk assessments by focusing on two phases of the ﬁnancial
statement audit process: the assessment of two attributes of audit evidence (‘strength’ and
‘direction’) and the aggregation of evidence. Based on an experiment in which 48 experi-
enced auditors participated, three important ﬁndings were observed. First, there was no
signiﬁcant difference in the mean assessment of strength of evidence measured using
the likelihood ratio. However, the difference in the assessed direction of evidence, that is
whether the evidence is interpreted as being conﬁrming or disconﬁrming, is signiﬁcant
for one of the cases examined. This result shows that auditors making belief-based assess-
ments are able to assess the direction of the evidence more accurately than auditors mak-
ing probability-based assessments. Third, the auditors’ aggregation of evidence was not in
accordance with ‘AND’ logic for either auditors making belief-based or probability-based
assessments. These empirical results raise issues which need to be addressed in practice
and in future research.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether the approach to risk assessment adopted by ﬁnancial statement
auditors affects their judgments. Two prominent approaches to risk assessment are experimentally manipulated: assess-
ments based on probability or on beliefs. Little is known about how auditors perform when they provide belief-based versus
probability-based assessments of evidential strength and direction and about their evidential reasoning which is required to
aggregate these assessments. In this study, we examine the assessment and aggregation of audit evidence by 48 practicing
auditors as they conduct part of an audit of ﬁnancial statements.
Quality audits require quality audit judgments including reliable risk assessments [1,2]. This follows from auditing stan-
dards which imply that a ﬁnancial statement audit must be risk-based. The importance of risk assessment also is emphasized
by Bell et al. [3] who argue that the audit is a ‘‘recursive process of evidence-driven, belief based risk assessment’’ (p. 5).
Although a great deal of research has investigated auditor judgments and factors that may affect such judgments [4–7],
much remains to be done, particularly with respect to risk assessments and evidential reasoning which are based on rigorous
theoretical models.. All rights reserved.
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planning and audit opinion formulation purposes. In summary, this process involves four key steps:
1. A thorough understanding of the client (company) being audited including its key business processes, strategy, and its
external environment such as industry, technological change, and regulation.
2. A detailed review and risk assessment of the client’s unaudited ﬁnancial statements and underlying internal controls that
are designed to help ensure high quality ﬁnancial reporting. The RMM assessment includes assessing the risk of material
misstatement due to both errors (unintentional) and frauds (intentional) in the ﬁnancial statements.
3. Planning and implementing a series of evidential collection methods (i.e., audit procedures) designed to permit the audi-
tor to determine, to some degree of precision, whether the ﬁnancial statement information quality meets generally
accepted accounting standards. The assessment of ﬁnancial statement information quality involves both the assessment
of the strength of the audit evidence and its direction where direction indicates whether the evidence conﬁrms or discon-
ﬁrms the ﬁnancial statement information. The assessment process also involves the aggregation from assessments of the
detailed ﬁnancial statement balances to assessments of the aggregated balances.
4. Based on the evidence collected, the auditor provides a formal ‘audit opinion’ as to the quality of the ﬁnancial statements.
Underlying all of the indicated risk assessments is a level of ambiguity or uncertainty which is contingent on the amount
of evidence collected by the audit team. Given that probability theory and the Theory of Belief Functions both provide rig-
orous approaches to addressing such ambiguities on a decision context, our research utilizes these theories in empirically
studying auditor judgments and decision making [8–11].
In the implemented experiment, the auditor participants completed Steps 1–3 above while focusing on a signiﬁcant part
of a client’s ﬁnancial statements – the stated balance in customer accounts receivable and related transactions such as cus-
tomer sales. Additional details concerning the experiment are reported in Fukukawa and Mock [8]. In their paper, they focus
on whether the belief-based risk assessments and probability-based risk assessments differ and whether an experimental
treatment not considered in this paper (framing effects) results in different risk assessments. Whereas they found that
the framing manipulation does signiﬁcantly affect the risk assessments, the risk assessments do not differ signiﬁcantly when
the belief-based assessments are transformed into ‘CS Transformed beliefs’ by using the Cobb and Shenoy [12–14] transfor-
mation method.
However, whether the risk assessment approach (belief-based versus probability-based) affects other aspects of auditors’
judgments is not examined in Fukukawa and Mock [8]. In particular, we are interested in audit process Step 3 as summarized
above. That is, this study investigates the auditor’s evaluation of the strength and direction of the provided evidence and the
related aggregation process, two phases of the audit process that are not addressed by Fukukawa and Mock [8].
Based on the same dataset as used in Fukukawa and Mock [8], we ﬁnd that the auditors’ assessments of strength of evi-
dence measured using the likelihood ratio do not differ signiﬁcantly. However, in one experimental setting, audit evidence
was interpreted differently contingent on whether the assessments were belief-based or probability-based. That is, the pro-
portions of auditors who interpret the evidence as conﬁrming (the likelihood ratio is larger than one), disconﬁrming (the
likelihood ratio is smaller than one), and having no diagnostic value (the likelihood is one) are signiﬁcantly different between
the two treatments.
We also ﬁnd that auditors do not aggregate their assessments according to the logical ‘AND’ rule implied by the judgment
setting being audited. These ﬁndings indicate that the risk assessment approach may have critical effects that need to be
considered in business and audit practice and in future audit research.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
The importance of risk assessment in auditing continues to be emphasized in the literature [3] as is evidenced by the issu-
ance of new ‘risk assessment’ auditing standards (SAS Nos. 104–111). One purpose of these standards is ‘to result in more
effective audits as a result of better risk assessments and improved design and performance of audit procedures to respond
to the risks’ [15].These standards suggest that a ﬁnancial statement audit is a recursive process in which auditors make risk
assessments related to various ﬁnancial statement assertions made by management. The audit team must plan, collect and
evaluate appropriate amounts and types of audit evidence in response to assessed risks and aggregate the evidence to form
an opinion regarding the ‘fair presentation’ (i.e., the reliability and validity) of ﬁnancial statements.
Although auditing standards emphasize the importance of risk assessment and require auditors to consider the ‘likeli-
hood’ that a material misstatement will occur (e.g., SAS No. 109 and No. 110; ISA 315), few guidelines are provided about
how to deﬁne likelihood or how to measure and express risks. Auditing standards suggest that risk components may be as-
sessed quantitatively by using percentages or non-quantitatively by using a categorical scale (SAS No. 47) such asmaximum–
moderate–low or high–medium–low. However, in cases such as when conducting audit sampling, auditors may feel comfort-
able with using a percentage (e.g., a ‘probability’) in assessing sampling risk since sampling techniques are usually based on
probability theory [16].
Given that the audit risk formula is illustrated by using a percentage scale in auditing standards, audit risk is often con-
ceptualized as the probability of a material misstatement. Historically, during audit planning, auditors could assess two
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the most efﬁcient approach (SAS No. 47). However, it is problematic to set inherent or control risk at maximum because a 1.00
probability assessment implies certainty [9,17]. During audit planning, the auditor has limited evidence and almost never would
be certain as to either inherent or control risk.
A more reasonable interpretation of assuming maximum risk is that it is the plausibility of a material misstatement that is
being assessed. That is, the assessed risk is the sum of the belief that a material misstatement is present and an assessment of
uncommitted belief [17]. Thus in auditing standards and practice, it is unclear whether audit risk is considered to be prob-
ability or plausibility.
One important problem encounteredwhen using probability in risk assessment is that the level of ambiguity auditors have
concerning the risk assessment is not made explicit. However, standards suggest that unless an auditor decreases the level of
ambiguity to an acceptable level, an audit opinion, whether unqualiﬁed or qualiﬁed, should not be provided (e.g., ISA 700).
Unlike probability assessments, auditors must explicitly express the level of ambiguity under the belief functions ap-
proach. While using either belief-based or probability-based risk assessments would contribute to making auditors’ risk
assessments quantitative, belief-based assessments have the additional advantage of making the level of ambiguity explicit.
However, it is not clear whether these two approaches result in different audit judgments and behavior. Obtaining experi-
mental evidence on differences between belief-based and probability-based assessments will both clarify this issue and al-
low audit quality to be improved.
In psychology, judgment elicitation approach effects often have been addressed as the issue of response mode effects. For
example, some psychology research has investigated whether probability judgments elicited verbally are different from
judgments elicited numerically and has found that people express their judgments verbally and numerically equally well
and consistently [18,19]. However, other studies report signiﬁcant response mode effects. For example, more extreme re-
sponses are observed in verbal judgments as compared to numerical judgments [20].
The effect of the elicitation approach on probability judgments has also been examined in auditing research.2 For example,
Reimers et al. [22] compare control risk assessments made by using categorical expressions (very low, low, moderate, high) with
those made using probabilities and ﬁnd that the numerical assessments are signiﬁcantly smaller than the categorical assess-
ments. They also ﬁnd that consensus is higher when categorical assessments are used. However, Stone and Dilla [23] report that
in assessing inherent risk, auditors show higher consensus and consistency when their risk assessments are numerical rather
than categorical.
Crosby [24] examines probability distributions regarding error rates of internal controls obtained by using a cumulative
distribution function technique or an equivalent prior sample technique and ﬁnds that there is no signiﬁcant difference in
means or medians, but ﬁnds that the interquartile range is signiﬁcantly different. Abdolmohammadi and Wright [25] com-
pare four probability elicitation methods and ﬁnd that they vary in terms of the degree of consensus and cost while there is
no signiﬁcant difference in the ease-of-use assessments.
In summary, prior studies in psychology, auditing and accounting do ﬁnd response mode effects in various probability
assessment contexts. A study of risk assessments which is belief-based versus probability-based contributes to the literature
by providing evidence concerning possible important differences in risk assessment and evidential reasoning.
2.1. The effect of ‘approach’ on the assessment of audit evidence
One important feature of auditing is the assessment of evidence as auditing standards require auditors to obtain sufﬁcient
and appropriate audit evidence (e.g., SAS No. 106). However, it is not clear how auditors should assess and measure the suf-
ﬁciency and appropriateness of obtained evidence. In determining whether sufﬁcient and appropriate evidence has been ob-
tained and in assessing audit risk, auditors need to assess the direction of evidence, that is, whether it is conﬁrming,
disconﬁrming, mixed or has no diagnostic value, and the strength of evidence. A novel feature of this study is that we estimate
the auditor’s implicit assessment of direction/strength of evidence and examine the effects of risk assessment approach on
the auditors’ assessments.
Given that there is no prior study that examines the effect of risk assessment approach on auditors’ assessments of evi-
dence and it is unclear how such differences would affect the auditor’s implicit assessment of the strength of evidence or of
whether evidence tends to be conﬁrming, disconﬁrming or mixed, our hypotheses are stated in a null form as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1a. The assessed strength of evidence using belief-based versus probability-based assessments is not expected to
differ signiﬁcantly.
HYPOTHESIS 1b. The assessed direction of evidence using belief-based versus probability-based assessments is not expected to
differ signiﬁcantly.1 According to auditing standards (e.g., ISA 200), inherent risk (IR) is deﬁned as the susceptibility of an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance
or disclosure to a misstatement that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, before consideration of any related
controls. Control risk (CR) is deﬁned as the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance or disclosure
and that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis
by the entity’s internal control. The risk of material misstatement (RMM) is a combination of inherent risk and control risk (i.e., IR  CR).
2 For a review of early ‘subjective probability’ research in accounting, see Chesley [21].
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A second important aspect of evidence evaluation in auditing is the aggregation of audit evidence. Under the audit risk
model, auditors need to consider the effects of misstatements in the aggregate as well as at the ﬁnancial statement ac-
count-level in light of a signiﬁcance or materiality threshold (e.g., SAS No. 107). Although auditing standards provide little
guideline regarding how to aggregate evidence across ﬁnancial statement assertions, one logical approach to quantitatively
aggregate the assessments is to use the logical ‘AND’ rule [17]. This logic provides an important benchmark to evaluate the
auditors’ judgments by comparing their actual aggregations with those derived using the ‘AND’ rule.
Prior studies report that auditors do not aggregate various assessments well. For example, Jiambalvo and Waller [26]
ﬁnd that auditors’ actual assessments of the allowable risk of incorrect acceptance for planned substantive audit tests
based on three risk components are signiﬁcantly different from those calculated by using the audit risk model as speciﬁed
in SAS No. 39. Similar results are reported by Daniel [27], who examines auditors’ assessments of audit risk components
and ﬁnds that auditors do not aggregate the audit risk components in a way that is consistent with the models in auditing
standards.
Dusenbury et al. [28] compare various audit risk models such as the SAS No. 39/47 model, a model adopted by an auditing
ﬁrm and a belief functions-based model and ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc model is more conservative than the SAS No. 39/47
model and that the belief functions-based model is more conservative than the ﬁrm-speciﬁc model. Monroe and Ng [10] com-
pare auditors’ intuitive assessments of audit risk and the traditional audit risk model as well as various alternative models
including the belief functions model. They ﬁnd that there are inconsistencies between the auditors’ intuitive assessments
and the traditional audit risk model, but there is no signiﬁcant difference between the auditors’ intuitive assessments and
the belief functions model. Furthermore, Mock et al. [11] indicate by analyzing verbal protocol data that although most audi-
tors exhibit reasoning consistent with a probability representation, the auditors have difﬁculty in revising beliefs consistent
with Bayes’ theorem in the evidence aggregation phase of the task.
Given that prior studies show evidence that auditors have difﬁculty in aggregating their risk assessments, it is important
to examine whether risk assessment approach also affects the degree of consistency with ‘AND’ logic in aggregating evidence
as well as whether the aggregation of evidence assessments based on belief functions and probability differs. However, it is
unclear how the approach to risk assessment might affect either the level of aggregated evidence assessments or the degree
of consistency with ‘AND’ logic. Thus, our hypotheses are stated in a null form as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2a. The aggregated levels of assessed risks obtained using belief-based versus probability-based assessments are
not expected to differ signiﬁcantly.
HYPOTHESIS 2b. The aggregated levels of assessed risks obtained using belief-based versus probability-based assessments are
not expected to differ signiﬁcantly from those obtained using ‘AND’ logic.
3. Research method
3.1. Research framework
In this study, the auditor’s task is modeled as an evidential network. Evidential networks have been utilized in many deci-
sion making studies [29,30] and in auditing [17,31–33]. Fig. 1 depicts the sequential reasoning involved in our experiment
and shows key relationships among three ﬁnancial statement sub-assertions, an overall assertion and provided audit
evidence.3.2. Description of the experiment
To examine the hypotheses, an experiment was conducted using 48 practicing auditors from Japanese Big 4 ﬁrms.3 The
case materials used were developed by the researchers, pilot tested and revised according to suggestions provided by liaisons
from one of the participating ﬁrms. Then liaisons from each audit ﬁrm distributed the case materials, collected completed ones
and forwarded them to the researchers.
Among the 48 participants, seven are partners, six are senior managers, 14 are managers, 12 are seniors and eight are
junior auditors (data on staff rank are missing for one participant). The participants were randomly assigned to each treat-
ment with 25 and 23 auditors assigned to the belief functions treatment and the probability treatment, respectively. Their
average audit experience is 9.6 years. Although there was a wide range of experience in the participant pool, the experience
difference does not signiﬁcantly affect any of the reported ﬁndings. We also tested possible effects of their staff rank and ﬁrm
on their assessments. As a result, we found no signiﬁcant staff rank effect or ﬁrm effect.3 In the experiment, a 2  2 factorial design was adopted where the approach to elicit auditors’ risk assessments and the framing of an assertion to be veriﬁed
were manipulated. However, in this paper we focus on the approach effect and thus remove the framing manipulation. As a result, half of the participants are
excluded from the sample discussed here.
Background 
Information
Sub-assertion
(Existence)
Sub-assertion
(Existence)
Sub-assertion
(Existence)
Audit 
Evidence
Audit 
Evidence
Audit 
Evidence
AND
Overall
Assertion
Experimental Procedures
1. Provision of 
the background 
information
2. Prior 
assessments of 
the three 
sub-assertions
3. Provision of 
the audit 
evidence
4. Posterior 
assessments of 
the three 
sub-assertions
5. Final 
assessments of 
the overall 
assertion
Fig. 1. Evidential network for auditors’ risk assessments and its aggregation and experimental procedures.
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In the experiment, we manipulate the ‘approach’ (belief-based versus probability-based assessments) to elicit auditors’
assessments related to three sub-assertions and one overall assertion. The research instrument is organized as follows
(see Fig. 1). First, the purpose of the study and general instructions were provided to participants. Then training materials
illustrated how auditors’ risk assessments should be expressed using either beliefs or probabilities. Six illustrative examples
depicting varying levels of prior knowledge and types of evidence were provided. Part of the training materials is presented
in Appendix A.
Following the instruction and training sections, three pages of background information on a hypothetical client was pro-
vided. The client was described as a manufacturer of tools for cutting materials and parts. The client’s business had been
steadily expanding over the past several years, had gone public one year ago, and their control environment was described
as not being strong. Also, information regarding the audit engagement, the results of the prior years’ audit, a materiality
threshold, and the summarized ﬁnancial statements was included.
Then the participants were asked to assume that they were working on the audit of accounts receivable. They were pro-
vided with three sub-assertions (existence, valuation and accuracy). The existence, valuation and accuracy sub-assertions
were described as follows: ‘‘The accounts receivable on the 2004 balance sheet exist.’’; ‘‘The valuation of accounts receivable
on the 2004 balance sheet is proper.’’; and ‘‘The sales transactions for 2004 are accurately recorded.’’ After that, they were
asked to make risk assessments related to these assertions based on the background information using either beliefs or
probabilities.
In the belief functions treatment, the auditors were asked to express the belief assessment that a presented sub-assertion
was true (m(a)), the belief assessment that the sub-assertion was false (m(a)), and the uncommitted belief (m({a,a})) so
that the sum of these three assessments equals to one. In the probability treatment, the auditors were asked to assess the
probability that a sub-assertion was true (p(a)) and the probability that the sub-assertion was false (p(a)) so that the
sum of these two assessments equals to one.4
After these assessments were made, audit evidence was provided for each sub-assertion, and the auditors were asked to
update the assessments, that is to provide posteriors, based on the evidence. The provided audit evidence for the existence,
valuation and accuracy assertions, respectively, was (1) the results of conﬁrmations of the accounts receivable; (2) the re-
sults of enquiries to the company’s credit department concerning the estimate of the allowance for bad debts; and (3) the
results of the statistical sampling and vouching of sales transactions and related documents (for the provided evidence,
see Appendix B).
Based upon pilot testing and consultations with liaisons, we expect the evidence for the existence and accuracy assertions
to be moderate in strength and conﬁrming. The evidence for the valuation assertion, the credit department enquiries, is ex-
pected to be mixed (partly conﬁrming and partly disconﬁrming), but overall, slightly conﬁrming. The evidence also varied in
terms of its source where the evidence for the existence sub-assertion is from outside the client, the evidence for the valu-
ation sub-assertion is from an internal source, and the evidence for the accuracy sub-assertion includes documents prepared4 As stated, when probability is used to express risk assessments, the level of ambiguity involved is usually not made explicit. However, an explicit
assessment of ambiguity was included by asking the participants to assess the range within which the probability that the assertion is true was expected to lie.
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evidence are generally consistent with these expectations.
The audit evidence was designed so that each item of evidence could be assessed independently. To reinforce this, when
updating the assessments of each sub-assertion, the auditors were asked to take only the item for a particular sub-assertion
into account and not to consider the evidence for other assertions. Independence among the evidence items allows us to
model the evidential network with a ‘tree structure’ (see Fig. 1) rather than as a network which is a much more complex
structure to model and evaluate.
Then the auditors made ﬁnal assessments of the overall assertion regarding the fair presentation of the accounts receiv-
able based on all the information provided in the case materials including the background information and the audit evi-
dence provided for each sub-assertion. The ﬁnal assessments require the auditors to aggregate the prior risk assessments
and evidence assessments.
3.4. Variables
The main independent variable of this study is the approach used to express auditors’ risk assessments of various asser-
tions (belief-based versus probability-based). As stated above, we are interested in whether the auditors’ evidence assess-
ments and aggregation of evidence are affected by the approach used to express their risk assessments.
Since the belief and probability assessments are measured on a different scale, it is not meaningful to compare these
assessments directly. Thus, to compare the risk assessments and other attributes related to these assessments, we transform
belief assessments into ‘CS Transformed beliefs’ using the plausibility transformation method proposed by Cobb and Shenoy
[12–14] and make comparisons based on the transformed beliefs and the corresponding probability assessments. Cobb and
Shenoy conclude that the method they propose is the correct method for transforming beliefs to equivalent probabilities that
maintains belief function semantics by demonstrating that the method satisﬁes properties such as invariance with respect to
combination and idempotency. However, the transformation results in loss of information on the ambiguity assessments
that is obtained in the belief-based assessments.
To measure the assessed strength and direction of evidence, we use the likelihood ratio, kE, as deﬁned in Srivastava et al.
[34]. The variable kE is deﬁned as (p0(a)/p0(a))/(p(a)/p(a)), and p0(a) and p0(a) are posterior probability assessments that an
assertion ‘a’ is true and false, respectively, and p(a) and p(a) are prior probability assessments that an assertion ‘a’ is true and
false, respectively. If kE is larger than one (kE > 1), this implies that, overall, the direction of evidence is perceived as conﬁrming
the assertion ‘a’ and that the larger kE is, the stronger the perceived evidence is. On the other hand, if kE is smaller than one
(0 < kE < 1), the direction of evidence is perceived as disconﬁrming the assertion ‘a’, and the smaller kE is, the stronger the evi-
dence is. Also, if kE equals to one, the evidence is perceived as having no strength or direction, that is, no diagnostic value.
Under the belief functions framework, it is possible to calculate the assessed strength and direction of evidence based on
Dempster’s rule. However, directly comparing these assessments to the Bayesian likelihood ratios is not meaningful. Thus, to
compare the implicit strength of evidence assessments, for the belief assessments we calculate kE by using ‘CS Transformed
beliefs’ based on Cobb and Shenoy [12–14].
As discussed, aggregation of audit evidence over various elements of ﬁnancial statements is an important part of auditing.
Thus, Hypothesis 2a suggests a possible difference in the aggregation process between the belief functions approach and the
probability approach, and Hypothesis 2b suggests a possible signiﬁcant difference in the degree of consistency of auditors’
aggregation of evidence with ‘AND’ logic. To test these hypotheses, we calculate assessments of an overall assertion based on
the assessments of the sub-assertions using ‘AND’ logic and compare the calculated assessments with the actual auditors’
assessments.
In the experiment, auditors make belief or probability assessments of three sub-assertions and the overall assertion as
described earlier. ‘AND’ logic implies that the overall assertion is true if and only if the three sub-assertions are true.
Although there are alternative ways of aggregating these items, we investigate the use of the logical AND rule as it is the
prominent approach used in prior evidential reasoning studies [17,35]. According to probability theory and ‘AND’ logic,
the probability that the overall assertion is true is calculated as follows.pðaOÞ ¼ pðaEÞpðaVÞpðaAÞ
where p(aO) is the probability that the overall assertion is true, p(aE) is the probability that the existence assertion is true,
p(aV) is the probability that the valuation assertion is true and p(aA) is the probability that the accuracy assertion is true.
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we calculate assessments of an overall assertion based on the assessments of the sub-asser-
tions using ‘AND’ logic and compare the calculated assessments with the actual auditors’ assessments.4. Results
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the raw risk assessments in the belief functions framework (that is,
m(a) and Pl(a)), the transformed belief assessments, and the probability assessments (that is, p(a)) for the three
sub-assertions and the overall assertion. Fig. 2 graphically depicts the relationships between these three assessments. As
expected, for all assertions, Pl(a) is the most conservative measure of risk,m(a) is the least conservative and p(a) always
Priors Posteriors
Fig. 2. Range that risk is assessed to fall within before and after audit evidence was provided for the existence (EX), valuation (VL), accuracy (AC) and overall
or fairly stated (OA) assertions. (The lower point on each line represents m (a) and the upper point represents Pl(a). The square shows p(a).)
Table 1
Risk assessments (means and standard deviations, N = 48).
Before evidence is provided After evidence is provided
Belief functions Transformed belief Probability Belief functions Transformed belief Probability
m(a) Pl(a) Pl(a)/(Pl(a) + Pl(a)) p(a) m(a) Pl(a) Pl(a)/(Pl(a) + Pl(a)) p(a)
Existence assertion .184 .804 .497 .450 .128 .364 .286 .288
(.246) (.243) (.144) (.191) (.157) (218) (.151) (.195)
Valuation assertion .200 .856 .524 .478 .312 .748 .529 .467
(.277) (.216) (.142) (.173) (324) (.279) (.220) (.174)
Accuracy assertion .176 .788 .488 .454 .172 .420 .329 .347
(.239) (.255) (.147) (.207) (.234) (268) (.203) (.255)
Overall assertion – – – .168 .428 .326 .347
(199) (.284) (.189) (.138)
Notation: m(a) is the belief assessment that an assertion is false. Pl(a) and Pl(a) are the plausibility assessments that an assertion is true and false,
respectively. p(a) is the probability assessment that an assertion is false.
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of the risk measures except m(a) for the valuation sub-assertion became lower after audit evidence was provided. This
indicates that the provided audit evidence had conﬁrming diagnostic value, which is consistent with the expected diagnos-
ticity of the audit evidence as validated in the pilot tests.
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we examine whether assessed strength and direction of evidence (kE) provided for each
sub-assertion is different between the belief functions approach and the probability approach. Table 2 shows the assessed
strength and direction of evidence provided for each sub-assertion. We exclude from the sample the three cases that the pos-
terior assessments (that is, p0(a)) include a zero value.5
The evidence provided for the existence and accuracy sub-assertions are assessed stronger than the evidence for the val-
uation sub-assertion, but all evidence is perceived as conﬁrming the sub-assertions. These results are generally consistent
with our expectations based on pilot testing and consultations with liaisons.
To examine whether the mean assessment of strength of evidence between the approaches are signiﬁcantly different, we
conduct t-tests. The results show that there is no signiﬁcant difference in the mean assessment for all sub-assertions, which
supports Hypothesis 1a.
However, focusing on the proportion of subjects that perceived evidence as conﬁrming, disconﬁrming and having no diag-
nostic value, we ﬁnd that there is a marginally signiﬁcant difference in the proportions between the belief-based assess-
ments and the probability-based assessments for the accuracy assertion (chi-square test, p = .080). More speciﬁcally, in
the probability treatment, relatively more participants assessed the a priori conﬁrming evidence to be either disconﬁrming
(0 < kE < 1) or to have essentially no diagnostic value (kE = 1) for the sub-assertion.5 For the probability treatment, two and one cases are excluded from the analysis for the existence and the accuracy sub-assertions, respectively.
Table 2
Assessed strength of evidence (kE).
Mean Number [%] of subjects that
perceived evidence as
disconﬁrming (0 < kE < 1)
Number [%] of subjects that
perceived evidence as
having no value (kE = 1)
Number [%] of subjects
that perceived evidence
as conﬁrming (kE > 1)
Chi-square test
results (p-value)
Existence sub-assertion
Belief functions 3.42 1 [4.0%] 2 [8.0%] 22 [88.0%] .447
Probability 2.92 3 [14.3%] 2 [9.5%] 16 [76.2%]
Valuation sub-assertion
Belief functions 1.27 8 [32.0%] 7 [28.0%] 10 [40.0%] .737
Probability 1.50 7 [30.4%] 9 [39.1%] 7 [30.4%]
Accuracy sub-assertion
Belief functions 3.18 4 [16.0%] 1 [4.0%] 20 [80.0%] .080
Probability 3.95 7 [31.8%] 4 [18.2%] 11 [50.0%]
Table 3
Comparison between the assessments calculated using ‘AND’ logic and the actual assessments of the overall assertion (the transformed beliefs and the original
probabilities).
Assessments based on ‘AND’ logic aggregation Actual assessments Paired samples t-test
results (p-value)
Assessment that the
overall assertion is true
Assessment that the
overall assertion is false
Assessment that the
overall assertion is true
Assessment that the
overall assertion is false
Belief functions .261 .739 .674 .326 .000
Probability .273 .727 .653 .347 .000
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the evidence more accurately than auditors using probability. This suggests that in some cases auditors’ assessments of
whether mixed evidence is overall conﬁrming or disconﬁrming can be inﬂuenced by the approach used to make such assess-
ments. This result provides evidence that rejects the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b).
Concerning Hypotheses 2a and 2b, Table 3 shows the means of the auditors’ assessments that the overall assertion that
the accounts receivables are fairly stated is true (false) assuming ‘AND’ logic aggregation and the actual direct assessments
that the overall assertion is true (false) based on ‘CS Transformed beliefs’ for the belief functions treatment and the original
probability assessments for the probability treatment. t-Test results for the assessments show that there is no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in any assessment between the belief functions treatment and the probability treatment. These results indicate that
the level of aggregated assessments is not affected by the approach to risk assessment, which are consistent with the null
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a). Although consistent with the results of prior hypothesis tests, this is somewhat surprising as
the assessment of the overall assertion involves all three aspects of audit judgment investigated: assessment of risk, assess-
ment of evidence and aggregation of evidence.
Also, to compare the actual assessments and the logical assessments, we conduct paired-samples t-tests. The results indi-
cate that for both treatments, the logical assessments and the actual assessments are signiﬁcantly different (p = .000). That is,
auditors assess the belief/probability that the overall assertion is true signiﬁcantly higher than the aggregated belief/prob-
ability calculated based on ‘AND’ logic. This suggests that auditors’ aggregation of evidence is not consistent with ‘AND’ logic
irrespective of the risk assessment approach and clearly rejects the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b).
5. Conclusion
This experimental study presents an evidential network framework for the auditors’ basic evidential reasoning process
and explores differences in auditors’ risk assessments when these assessments are belief-based or probability-based. The re-
search questions being explored are (1) whether auditors assess the strength and direction of evidence differently, and (2)
whether they aggregate the evidence according to ‘AND’ logic when their judgments are based on belief or probability
assessments. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in the mean assessed strength of evidence measured using the likelihood ratio
and in the aggregation of evidence between the probability and belief functions treatments.
However, another ﬁnding indicates that there is a signiﬁcant approach difference that should be considered. That is, the
proportion of auditors who perceive the evidence as conﬁrming, disconﬁrming and having no diagnostic value is signiﬁcantly
different between the probability and belief functions treatments for the accuracy sub-assertion. This result implies that
auditors’ assessments of evidence may be inﬂuenced by the approach, depending on the nature of the evidence. Examining
the interaction between the approach and the nature of evidence is an important issue for future research.
We also ﬁnd that auditors’ aggregation of evidence is not in accordance with ‘AND’ logic both for belief-based and prob-
ability-based assessments. This result may imply that auditors are using an alternative logic such as a weighting scheme as
discussed in Gao and Srivastava [35], which also warrants future research.
198 H. Fukukawa, T.J. Mock / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 190–199Some limitations should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. First, in practice, auditors do not express belief-
based or probability-based risk assessments. Thus, there may be learning or training effects that have inﬂuenced the results.
Second, although the case materials includes a signiﬁcant amount of information about the audit engagement, the results of
the prior years’ audit, a materiality threshold, description of the control environment, summarized ﬁnancial statements and
the results of audit tests, more information is normally available in an actual audit setting. Also, the participants were all
trained within Big 4 audit ﬁrms and thus may not reﬂect the judgments of auditors trained and practicing in smaller ﬁrms.
Lastly, the participants were all auditors who practice in Japan. Although Japanese auditing practice and standards are com-
parable to US and international standards and conventions, still it is possible that Japanese auditors exhibit certain cultural
or other attributes which would differentiate them from other auditors worldwide. These limit the generalizability (external
validity) of our ﬁndings and provide opportunities for additional future research.
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Elicitation of the assessments:
The participant instructions concerning how to make the assessments are illustrated below. The actual elicitations were
made using the same approaches. For example, for the ﬁrst probability assessment the participants were asked to assess the
range within which the probability that the assertion they were considering is true is likely to fall. As another example, for
the belief assessments they were asked to indicate their ‘‘uncommitted belief’’, that is the level of ambiguity that they have
about whether the assertion being considered was true or was false.
Training instructions:
Suppose that you are in a hotel early one morning in Hong Kong and you are dressing for the day. You have not looked out
the window, so you don’t know if it rained last night and whether you need to put on appropriate shoes for wet streets. The
relevant assertion that you would like some evidence about so that you may dress accordingly is ‘‘The streets of Hong Kong
are quite wet this morning.’’ You are asked to express:
Probability treatment:
1. Your assessment of the range within which the probability that the assertion ‘‘The streets of Hong Kong are quite wet this
morning.’’ is true is likely to fall. This assessment is intended to capture the level of uncertainty or ambiguity you have in
assessing the probabilities that the assertion is true or is false. Thus, the maximum uncertainty is indicated by a range of
0.0 to 1.0 and the minimum uncertainty by a probability estimate with no associated range.
2. Your assessment of the probability that the assertion is true, that is, the probability that the streets are indeed quite wet
and
3. your assessment of probability that the assertion is false, that is, that the streets are not wet.
You will need to express these assessments so that the sum of the two probability assessments in 2 and 3 equals one.Belief function treatment:
1. Your belief [‘feeling’] that the assertion is true, that is, that the streets are indeed quite wet
2. Your belief [‘feeling’] that the assertion is false, that is, that the streets are not wet and
3. Your ‘‘uncommitted belief’’, that is the level of uncertainty or ambiguity that you have as to whether the streets are wet or
are not wet.
You will need to express these beliefs so that the sum of these three beliefs equals one.Note: Following these instructions, six examples were provided to illustrate assessments that met the guidance pro-
vided above.Appendix B. Audit evidence provided on each sub-assertion
Existence sub-assertion:
You decided to perform positive conﬁrmations of accounts receivable from all debtors (40 companies). You drafted the
conﬁrmation requests and the debtors responded directly to you. You obtained responses from 30 companies (80% of the
H. Fukukawa, T.J. Mock / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 190–199 199balance of accounts receivable included in the 2004 balance sheet). Twenty-two out of the 30 companies conﬁrmed that the
balance stated on the conﬁrmation request was correct, while for the remaining eight companies, there was a difference
totaling ¥3,843,000 (totals of overstatement and understatement were ¥2,989,000 and ¥853,000, respectively) between
the balance on the conﬁrmation request and the amount in the company’s records. As a result of this investigation, you found
that for six out of the eight companies, the differences had occurred because the payment amount was in transit at the time
of conﬁrmation or there was a delay in recording the receipt of goods by the customer. For the remaining two companies, the
cause of the difference is still unknown. The amount of differences in disputed accounts receivable for these two companies
is ¥1,350,000 in total.
Valuation sub-assertion:
The credit department noted that, given the company’s past experiences with bad debts, they had estimated the percent-
age of bad debts to be lower than last year because of general improvement in the economic environment this year.
Accuracy sub-assertion:
Using statistical sampling, you selected a sample of 100 sales transactions recorded in the sales journal and traced them
back to vouchers such as customer orders, sales invoices and receipts. As a result, you found out that 97 out of the 100 trans-
actions were properly recorded. For the remaining three transactions, the amounts of two transactions were found to be re-
corded incorrectly and one transaction was found not to have been properly approved according to the company’s internal
policies.
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